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ABSTRACT
In recent years a number of authors have approached antitrust differ-
ently, looking not to parse the economics that inform antitrust out-
comes, but to the role that institutions play in antitrust decision-
making. My paper further contributes to this institutional discourse
by arguing that Congress founded the FTC to be the primary antitrust
decision maker, yet courts have failed to yield to Congressional
desires and the FTC's antitrust expertise. Paradoxically, the judiciary
has recognized their institutional foibles as antitrust has grown more
complex, while at the same time neglecting to yield to FTC decision-
making. I argue that the FTC should assert, and courts should grant,
Chevron deference to protect FTC expert decisions from judicial
meddling and to ultimately establish the technocratic institutional
structure that Congress sought in 1914.
* Christian Carlson (Vanderbilt University, J.D.; University of Oxford, M.Sc. (forthcoming);
Colorado College, B.A.) has served in various governmental offices, including with the Federal
Trade Commission, the Washington State Attorney General's Office, the Tennessee Attorney
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") turns 100 years old this
year, prompting reflection on its founding principles. Why was the
Federal Trade Commission created? What was the Federal Trade
Commission's institutional role? What should be the Federal Trade
Commission's institutional role?
As it turns out, the answers to these questions are not so simple.
The FTC was founded to rein in judicial decision-making and place
the expert decisions with the experts. However, the FTC does not
serve the institutional role that Congress sought in 1914. One Senator
sought "an administrative body of practical men thoroughly informed
in regard to business, who will be able to apply the rule enacted by
Congress to particular business situations, so as to eradicate evils with
the least risk of interfering with legitimate business operations."' This
Senator's charge, and the charge of his fellow Congressman, has not
been heeded.
Courts have acted contrary to congressional desires and not de-
ferred to the independent expert body tasked with preventing unfair
competition, the FTC. This is particularly troubling today, as modern
antitrust economics have made courts increasingly less able to make
normatively appropriate decisions.2 Courts themselves have recog-
nized this, erecting procedural and substantive barriers to protect
themselves from disturbing the market status quo.3 Yet, at the same
time, they have chosen not to defer to the FTC, the expert body
tasked with regulating the market.4 Courts have usurped agency deci-
sion-making power with occasionally questionable results.5 The FTC
should assert, and courts should grant, Chevron deference when the
FTC makes antitrust legal decisions in order to mitigate judicial error
and protect FTC expert decisions from the generalist judiciary's insti-
tutional shortcomings.
Part II of this paper addresses the FTC's founding principles and
agency structure. Part III highlights the complexity of antitrust cases
and how courts have used Chevron to respect agency expertise and
agency policymaking. Part IV discusses two FTC cases that may have
1. H.R. REP. No. 1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.).
2. See DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
142 (2011); Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal,
89 TEx. L. REv. 1247, 1286 (2011).
3. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986); Allied
Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).
4. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756. 759 (1999); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402
F.3d 1056, 1067 (11th Cir. 2005).
5. See Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 759; Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1067.
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benefitted from judicial deference, as well as two cases that illustrate
the possibility of applying Chevron deference in the antitrust context.
Finally, Part V dismisses the primary counterargument to Chevron's
application and points to two reforms that may encourage the judici-
ary to heed to FTC decision-making. Indeed, letting the experts make
the expert decisions is all the more important as the economy be-
comes ever more technical.6 As William Kovacic has put it, "one can-
not deliver broadband-quality policy outcomes through dial-up
institutions. "7
II. THE FTC ACT AND THE FTC's FOUNDATIONS
Twenty-four years after the Sherman Act was passed in 1890, Con-
gress acted to correct the haphazard way that antitrust law was being
enforced and created the FTC.8 Congress found judges insufficient as
both experts and as policy makers. 9 Legislators created an administra-
tive agency that has grown to include rulemaking authority and a ma-
ture technocratic structure.
A. FTC Founding Principles
In 1911, one Senator remarked before the Senate that "trusts are
more powerful to-day than when the antitrust act was passed, and that
evils have grown [ ] so interwoven with the general business of the
country as to make men tremble at the consequence of their disrup-
tion."10 The Sherman Act had failed to free the market and some
lawmakers found the problem to be institutional. 1 Legislators were
concerned that "the opinion of any given man in any given case . . .
whether he be judge or not, must depend largely, not upon his learn-
ing in the law but upon his training and bent in the economy of com-
merce."1 2 A commission of "trained, skillful, men" was needed for
6. William E. Kovacic, The Institutions of Antitrust Law: How Structure Shapes Substance, 110
MICH. L. REV. 1019, 1020 (2012).
7. See id.
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006); S. REP. No. 1326, (1914) [hereinafter Cummins Report] reprinted
in 5 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES
3737 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1981).
9. William E. Kovacic, The Quality of Appointments and the Capability of the Federal Trade
Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 915, 920 (1997) (quoting 51 CONG. REc. 11,083 (June 25, 1914)
(remarks of Sen. Newlands)).
10. Cummins Report, supra note 8, at 3741.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 3731.
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"the better administration of the law and to aid in its enforcement."13
Enforcing the Sherman Act required more than general knowledge.14
Antitrust's expertise problem was further compounded by legal am-
biguities that gave an unmoored judiciary free rein to determine eco-
nomic policy.15 The Sherman Act § 1 prohibited "[e]very contract,
combination . .. or conspiracy in restraint of trade." 16 Read literally,
the statute's sweeping language could prohibit fundamental business
relationships and the establishment of business hours. But the Su-
preme Court found in Sinclair Oil that Congress could not have in-
tended such a result and read a reasonableness exemption into § 1.17
While this was no doubt the correct result, what restraints were rea-
sonable and what restraints were not?' 8
The rule of reason left the antitrust landscape uncertain. 19 Worse in
Congressional eyes, unaccountable courts were wielding an ambigu-
ous reasonableness standard to determine antitrust legality.20 Courts
were "employ[ing] the functions of the legislator rather than the law-
yer." 2 1 Whenever the rule of reason was "invoked, the court d[id] not
administer the law, but ma[de] the law." 22 Courts not versed in com-
merce's niceties were left to make policy decisions based on their own
political bent.
B. FTC Powers and Structure
Thus, the need for an independent expert agency forced Congres-
sional hands. Congress and President Woodrow Wilson took action in
1914 to pass the Federal Trade Commission Act and establish the Fed-
eral Trade Commission. Today, the Act empowers the Commission to
prohibit "unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices." 23 The FTC Act's broad lan-
13. See id. at 3737.
14. See id. at 3735-37.
15. Cummins Report, supra note 8, at 3731.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
17. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
18. 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 1 302 (3d. ed. 2007)
(quoting Robert E. Cushman, The Problem of the Independent Regulatory Commissions, in RE-
PORT OF UNITED STATES PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 205, 211 (1937)).
19. Id.
20. See Cummins Report, supra note 8, at 3736.
21. Id. at 3731.
22. Id. at 3736.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). As originally passed in 1914, § 5 would condemn only "unfair
methods of competition." Section 5 was amended in 1938 to include "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce," partly to no longer require injury to a competitor as a prerequisite to
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guage permits the FTC to enforce the Sherman Act and condemn
"conduct that violates 'the spirit' of the Sherman [Act] . . . and even
conduct that is otherwise 'unfair.' "24
The FTC may enforce the FTC Act through informal adjudication,
formal adjudication, and rulemaking. 25 Informally the FTC may con-
duct investigations, issue guidance, and establish consent order agree-
ments. 26 Consent order agreements have become a favored tool for
resolution as they shorten disputes and correct market inefficiencies in
a speedy manner.2 7 If an FTC Act offender does not agree to a con-
sent order in the public interest, the Commission may institute formal
adjudicative proceedings. 2 8 In formal adjudicative proceedings, an
Administrative Law Judge ("AL") will make findings of fact and
conclusions of law like a trial court.2 9 The ALJ's determinations are
then automatically reviewed by the Commission as a whole.30 The
Commission may approve, modify, or rescind any order.3 1 The Com-
mission's findings of fact and conclusions of law are reviewable by a
Federal Court of Appeals. 32
The FTC also has rulemaking authority under 15 U.S.C. § 46(g). 33
Initially there was some doubt whether the FTC Act granted the FTC
rulemaking authority as to unfair or deceptive acts or practices and
unfair competition. 3 4 Today, the Commission has explicit statutory
rulemaking authority with regard to unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices and must follow the procedures spelled out in the Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act of 1975 ("Improvement Act"). 35
While the Improvement Act did not address unfair competition rules
or antitrust rules, it did note that the stipulated procedures for unfair
or deceptive acts or practices rules "shall not affect any authority of
FTC Act enforcement. 6 EARL W. KINTNER & WILLIAM P. KRATZKE, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAw § 43.16 (1986).
24. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, 302c; see also FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,
405 U.S. 233, 244-45 (1972) (noting that § 5 may be used to condemn a practice that is unfair yet
neither a violation of the antitrust laws nor deceptive).
25. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, 1 302d, 302g.
26. KINTNER & KRATZKE, supra note 23, §§ 45.46-49.
27. See id.
28. Id. § 45.49.
29. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, 302b.
30. Id. I 302e.
31. Id.
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, $ 302b.
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (2006); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, 1 302g; C. Scott
Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulernaking to Preserve
Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 678-79 n.203 (2009).
34. KINTNER & KRATZKE, supra note 23, § 43.24.
35. Id.
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the Commission to prescribe rules (including interpretive rules) and
general statements of policy, with respect to unfair methods of compe-
tition in or affecting commerce." 36 This suggests that the Commission
has the authority to pass antitrust rules and is consistent with a 1973
D.C. Circuit opinion that found the agency to have such authority, as
well as other courts finding rulemaking authority in ambiguous regula-
tory statutes.37 In fact, the Commission did enact one antitrust rule in
1968, regarding discriminatory practices in men's tailored clothing,
and "has considered promulgating [other] antitrust rules from time to
time, but has never followed through."38 Thus, the Commission likely
has both unfair or deceptive acts or practices rulemaking authority
and unfair competition rulemaking authority. 39
The FTC Act also established five commissioners who are "ap-
pointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate." 40 The commissioners must maintain some political balance
as no more than three of the five commissioners may be from the
same political party.41 A Commissioner "may be removed by the
President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." 42
Commissioners may not be removed for political disagreement or any
other reason.43 Each commissioner currently serves for a period of
seven years. 44
The FTC Commissioners supervise a mature organizational struc-
ture including competition lawyers, economists, and administrative
law judges.45 The FTC's Bureau of Competition is the FTC's legal
36. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2006); KINTNER & KRATZKE, supra note 23, § 43.24.
37. See Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (finding the
FTC to have rulemaking authority and failing to distinguish between consumer protection
rulemaking authority and antitrust rulemaking authority); Hemphill, supra note 33, at 678-79
n.203 (arguing that the FTC has antitrust rulemaking authority and pointing to several courts
finding rulemaking authority in ambiguous statutory language).
38. See CRANE, supra note 2, at 142 n.67 (citing 16 C.F.R. pt. 412 (1968), repealed by 59 FED.
REG. 8527-28 (Feb. 23 1994)); Hemphill, supra note 33, at 644; see also FED. TRADE COMM'N,
OPERATING MANUAL § 7.4 (1988), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/
ftc-administrative-staff-manuals/ch07rulemaking.pdf (noting that "the Commission has statutory
authority under FTCA § 6(g) to promulgate rules respecting unfair methods of competition");
but see Haw, supra note 2, at 1288 (arguing that while the FTC Act may permit the agency to
make rules and regulations, it is unclear whether those rules would be binding).
39. See Hemphill, supra note 33, at 678-79 n.203; see also CRANE, supra note 2, at 142 n.68
(noting that "[a]lthough Chevron deference may only apply to agency decisions that have the
'force of law' . . . this should not be an obstacle for the FTC.").
40. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 621 (1935).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 41.
45. CRANE, supra note 2, at 38.
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core of antitrust enforcement. 46 The Bureau of Competition houses
experienced antitrust litigators and investigators in the areas of merg-
ers, competition policy, healthcare competition, anticompetitive prac-
tices, and compliance. 47 Drawing on their specialized experience, the
Bureau of Competition's lawyers diligently "work ... to preserve the
free market system and assure the unfettered operation of the forces
of supply and demand." 48
The Bureau of Economics is the Commission's quantitative arm. 4 9
Roughly seventy Ph.D. level economists assist the Commission, the
Bureau of Competition, and other departments in economic and sta-
tistical matters related to the FTC's enforcement activities.50 The Bu-
reau of Economics helps to provide "an understanding of the actual or
probable effects of past or prospective government actions, as well as
an understanding of the industries or markets affected by such ac-
tions."51 The agency's economists issue internal memos assessing both
factual questions and legal doctrine to better advise the agency in
proper market functioning.
In sum, the FTC was born of institutional concerns. Displeased
with the Sherman Act's enforcement in the courts, Congress sought
the help of an independent market expert.52 Congress passed the
FTC Act, ultimately giving the FTC broad administrative powers and
structuring the FTC to maximize agency expertise. In the words of
Senator Newlands in 1914:
It is expected that the [FTC] will be composed not only of eminent
lawyers but of eminent economists, businessmen of large experi-
ence, and publicists, and that their knowledge and information and
experience will be of such a varied nature as to make them more
competent to deal with the practical question of the dissolution of
these combinations than any court or Attorney General could be.53
III. ANTITRUST ECONOMICS AND JUDICIAL INCOMPETENCY
Despite Congress's desire to remove antitrust decisions from judi-
cial hands, judges have again usurped antitrust authority and ulti-
mately neutered a potentially competent antitrust regime. Antitrust is
46. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, INSIDE BC 10-23 (2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/attachments/frequently-asked-questionsbcusersguide-1.pdf.
47. Id.
48. 16 C.F.R. § 0.16 (2000).
49. See CRANE, supra note 2, at 38.
50. See 16 C.F.R. § 0.18; CRANE, supra note 2, at 38.
51. KINTNER & KRATZKE, supra note 23, § 44.28.
52. See Cummins Report, supra note 8, at 3737; Kovacic, supra note 9, at 920.
53. Kovacic, supra note 9, at 920 (quoting 51 CONG. REC. 11,083 (June 25, 1914) (remarks of
Sen. Newlands)).
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complicated. Although antitrust has always been grounded in eco-
nomic theory, antitrust has seen a dramatic ideological shift "from a
debate about political economy to one about economic theory."54 But
the complex and sometimes ambiguous analytical tools of contempo-
rary economic theory have made generalist judges poor institutional
decision makers.55 Judges themselves have recognized their incapac-
ity and erected heavy procedural barriers in antitrust cases to limit
generalist judge's false positives; yet, judges have refused to defer to
agency antitrust experts.56 Courts have failed to give the FTC Chev-
ron deference in antitrust cases despite contemporary antitrust's ex-
pert focus.
A. Antitrust Economics and Complexity
The noneconomic ideological themes of "'tyranny,' 'autonomy,' and
'freedom"' that drove antitrust's early years better lent antitrust to
judicial decision-making. Rather than having to choose between op-
posing, sophisticated, economic arguments, judges could rely on
squishy populist notions to tip their decision. Since antitrust's found-
ing "these themes . . . have found expression in antitrust decisions."5 7
Courts have referred to the Sherman Act as the "Magna Carta of free
enterprise,"58 and as important to "providing an environment condu-
cive to the preservation of our democratic[,] political and social insti-
tutions." 59 In Appalachian Coal, Inc. v. United States, a case widely
thought to have prioritized political considerations over economic
analysis, the court referred to the Sherman Act as a "charter of
freedom."60
This is not to say that economics did not play a role in early anti-
trust decision-making. 61 Economics has always been part of antitrust
law. 6 2 Neoclassical economics heavily influenced early interpretations
of the Sherman Act, and New Deal economics reframed antitrust dis-
54. ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY TEXTBOOK 65 (2d ed. 2008) (emphasis in original).
55. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE § 2.2e (2d ed. 1999).
56. See e.g. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); Allied Orthopedic Appli-
ances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).
57. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 54, at 64.
58. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)
59. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
60. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933); see also HOVENKAMP,
supra note 55, § 5.2a.
61. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 54, at 65.
62. Id.
ANTITRUSTING THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
course in the 1930s. 6 3 Yet, "[c]asual observation of business behavior,
colorful characterizations . . ., eclectic forays into sociology and psy-
chology, descriptive statistics, and verification by plausibility took the
place of the careful definitions and parsimonious logical structure of
economic theory." 64 "[B]y the 1950's, more defined schools of eco-
nomic thought began to exert increasing influence on antitrust enforc-
ers and lawyers." 65 Economists began to have a more prominent role
in shaping antitrust law.66
The Chicago School and the subsequent antitrust schools of thought
have eroded antitrust analysis's noneconomic, populist considerations
in favor of more rigorous economic considerations. The Chicago
School's triumph represented the increasing view that economic effi-
ciency should be the exclusive goal of antitrust law.6 7 The previous
school's "eclectic forays" gave way to price theory, merger review,
and rigorous cost-benefit analysis.68 The Harvard School and post-
Chicago School added pragmatic considerations to the Chicago
School's analysis, as well as game theory and strategic modeling.69
Contemporary antitrust analysis, while valid, has grown "more com-
plex and more ambiguous than Chicago orthodoxy."70
Courts are ill-equipped to sort through contemporary antitrust com-
plexities. Generalist judges cannot be expected to understand, much
less sort through, the subtleties of economic theories and the assump-
tions they are based on.71 In a bench trial, a judge will have to make a
binary legality determination without fully grasping the economics. 72
One White House advisor noted in 2007 that very few candidates for
judicial selection have a "background in antitrust . . . [and the candi-
dates are] particularly daunted by the economics."73 Furthermore, as
technology companies come under increasing antitrust scrutiny,
judges will be even less equipped to understand complex technological
products, dynamic markets, and claimed exclusionary conduct.
63. HOVENKAMP, supra note 55, § 2.2a.
64. Richard Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 929
(1979).
65. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 54, at 65
66. Id.
67. HOVENKAMP, supra note 55, § 2.2b.
68. Posner, supra note 64, at 929; HOVENKAMP, supra note 55, at 60-63.
69. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 54, at 66-69.
70. HOVENKAMP, supra note 55, § 2.2e.
71. Haw, supra note 2, at 1263.
72. See CRANE, supra note 2, at 3, 97.
73. See Findings and Recommendations of the Antitrust Modernization Commission: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 7 (2007) (testimony of Jonathan R. Yarow-
sky, Vice Chair, Antitrust Modernization Commission).
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Contemporary antitrust litigation almost always requires expert ec-
onomic testimony "on market definition, market structure, market
power, the competitive significance of business conduct, antitrust in-
jury, and damages." 74 Entire books have been dedicated to selecting
and preparing economists for antitrust litigation.75 Statistical method-
ologies, like regression analysis, may be key to an antitrust case.
However, statistical methodologies are often based on hidden assump-
tions, "draw[ ] conclusions much stronger than the data permit[,]" or
ignore other causes. 76 The adversarial process may draw these flaws
out, and it may not. For example, in an antitrust damages assessment,
the Sixth Circuit failed to fault an expert that used inappropriate sta-
tistical methods and developed a "damage estimate [that] was not ro-
bust to different econometric specifications or to the elimination of
outliers." 77 And in another case, a court of appeals improperly vindi-
cated an expert's use of net rather than gross profits, which might
have reduced the damage estimate by half.78 Moreover, even if the
adversarial process brings flaws in expert testimony to light, the judge
is still tasked with assessing the flaw's legal salience.
B. Courts Appreciate Their Antitrust Aptitude
Judges themselves seem to have recognized the limits of their anti-
trust knowledge. They have erected procedural barriers and placed
substantive burdens on antitrust plaintiffs to protect themselves from
false positive antitrust rulings.79
For many years, courts used procedural devices sparingly to dismiss
antitrust cases.80 In the 1962 case of Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting,
Inc., the Supreme Court emphasized that "summary procedures
should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive
and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the
alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot."8 But, as
74. See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 399 (3d. ed.
2007).
75. THE USE OF ECONOMISTS IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION (Jay Greenfield & Mark S. Olinsky,
eds., 1984).
76. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND ExECUTION 81
(2005).
77. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, 399c (discussing Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco
Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002)).
78. Id. I 399c2 (discussing PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 171 Fed. Appx.
464 (5th Cir. 2006)). The defendant was later found not liable on unrelated legal grounds.
79. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986); Allied Ortho-
pedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).
80. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 54, at 279.
81. Poller v. Columbia Broad., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
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the Chicago School took hold, there was an increasing recognition of
the judiciary's limitations.8 2 In Matsushita Electric Industry Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., the Supreme Court found that "antitrust law lim-
its the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a
§ 1 case."8 3 "To survive a motion for summary judgment or for a di-
rected verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must
present evidence 'that tends to exclude the possibility' that the alleged
conspirators acted independently." 8 4 Similarly, the Supreme Court
placed heightened procedural standards on antitrust plaintiffs in the
2007 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly case.85 The court overruled de-
cades of precedent interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) to merely require notice pleading.86 Prior to Twombly, one
could make "an allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of
conspiracy," but that will no longer suffice.87 Plaintiffs have to
"nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,
[or] their complaint must be dismissed."88
Although the aforementioned heightened procedural standards
could be part of a general hostility to plaintiffs in business litigation,
they are consistent with the "contracted liability norms" that have
stemmed from antitrust's "substantive and institutionalist concerns."89
For example, in a 2010 Ninth Circuit product design case, Tyco ac-
cused a healthcare appliance manufacturer of purposefully designing
its appliances to be incompatible with Tyco's sensors "forcing custom-
ers and OEMs to adopt the [manufacturer's sensors] by discontinuing
[Tyco's sensors] and implementing other exclusionary business prac-
tices." 90 The court noted that "changes in product design are not im-
mune from antitrust scrutiny and in certain cases may constitute an
unlawful means of maintaining monopoly under Section 2."91 But
product design changes that have a predatory result do not establish
liability so long as the plaintiff can show that the product was an im-
provement and that there was no accompanying antitrust violation.92
"There is no room in [the product design] analysis for balancing the
82. CRANE, supra note 2, at 59.
83. Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 588.
84. Id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)).
85. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
86. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 54, at 281.
87. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
88. Id. at 570.
89. CRANE, supra note 2, at 61.
90. Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 998 (9th
Cir. 2010).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1000.
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benefits or worth of a product improvement against its anticompeti-
tive effects." 93 Courts are ill-equipped "[t]o weigh the benefits of an
improved product design against the resulting injuries to competitors
... [as t]here are no criteria that courts can use to calculate the 'right'
amount of innovation."94
Narrow liability rules can also be seen in the predatory pricing area.
Wary of the adjudicative system's ability to make antitrust decisions,
Judge Breyer, sitting on the Court of Appeals, neglected to adopt a
predatory pricing test that would find a Sherman Act § 2 violation
when the defendant's prices exceeded "both 'average cost' and 'incre-
mental cost.'"95 Judge Breyer found that while such a broad rule may
better "embody every economic complexity and qualification [it] may
well, through the vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive,
undercutting the very economic ends they seek to serve." 96 Law, "un-
like economics, . . . is an administrative system the effects of which
depend upon the content of rules and precedents only as they are ap-
plied by judges and juries in courts and by lawyers advising their cli-
ents." 97 Courts must "take account of the institutional fact that
antitrust rules are court-administered rules." 98
C. Chevron's Possibilities
Despite the Chicago School and post-Chicago School's emphasis on
economic theory, a corresponding recognition of the judiciary's lim-
ited ability to assess complex antitrust arguments, and the limitations
the judiciary has placed on its own discretion in antitrust matters, the
judiciary has neglected to defer to the agency created in 1914 to con-
fine judicial decision making and address antitrust's fomenting eco-
nomic complexities: the FTC. The Supreme Court's watershed
decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. NRDC held that deference should
be given to agency interpretations of the statutes that agencies admin-
ister when the statute is ambiguous and the statutory interpretation is
reasonable.99 Nevertheless, the FTC has not received Chevron defer-
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 233 (1st Cir. 1983); CRANE, supra
note 2, at 61.
96. Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 233 (emphasis added); see CRANE, supra note 2, at 61.
97. Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 233 (emphasis added); see CRANE, supra note 2, at 61.
98. Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990); see CRANE, supra
note 2, at 61.
99. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
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ence. 0 0 The FTC's statutory interpretations have been wrongly ig-
nored in a number of cases, though some cases seem to acknowledge
that Chevron deference may be possible in the antitrust context.' 0
The Chevron case concerned environmental regulation; a similarly
complicated regulatory area. 102 The Clean Air Act required States
that had not met proscribed air quality standards to implement "a per-
mit program regulating 'new or modified major stationary sources' of
air pollution."' 03 As part of this implementation, the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") defined "stationary source" expansively
to allow "an existing plant that contains several pollution-emitting de-
vices [to] install or modify one piece of equipment without meeting
the permit conditions if the alteration would not increase the total
emissions from the plant."104 The National Resource Defense Coun-
cil (NRDC) challenged this definition, arguing that such a broad defi-
nition of "stationary source" was not permissible under the Clean Air
Act. 05
Notwithstanding the NRDC's arguments, the Supreme Court de-
ferred to the EPA's statutory construction, explicitly carving out a
schema of judicial deference to agency decisions. 106 "First, always, is
the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue." 07 When Congressional intent is clear, the court
and the agency must abide by Congressional wishes. But, "if the stat-
ute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the ques-
tion for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute."108 The agency, not the court,
is to resolve statutory ambiguity as Congress has "left a gap for the
agency to fill."1 09
The Chevron court properly recognized that the EPA's "regulatory
scheme is technical and complex, [that] the agency considered the
matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and [that] the decision in-
100. See e.g. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999); Schering-Plough Corp. v.
FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1067 (11th Cir. 2005).
101. See Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 759; Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1067; Mich. Citizens for an
Indep. Press v. Thornburg, 868 F.2d 1285, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Fresh & Process Potatoes
Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141 n.9 (D. Idaho 2011).
102. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839-40.
103. Id. at 840.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 840, 860-61.
106. Id. at 837, 843-44.
107. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
108. Id. at 843.
109. Id. at 843-44.
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volve[d] reconciling conflicting policies."" 0 Congress may have
meant for the agency to bring its expertise to bear on competing pol-
icy concerns; may have not considered the specific policy question at
issue; or may have been "unable to forge a coalition on either side of
the question."111 But this is irrelevant for judicial purposes.112
"Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political
branch of the Government. . . . [F]ederal judges-who have no con-
stituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by
those who do."113
IV. CHEVRON, UNAPPLIED
The FTC, an independent agency, has invoked the Chevron doc-
trine at least one time.114 When it did, as discussed below, the Su-
preme Court neglected to acknowledge the FTC's interpretive power
and ultimately ruled against the FTC's substantive antitrust interpre-
tation.115 This is consistent with the judicial respect for the FTC's ex-
pertise generally and has led to questionable antitrust decisions in
some cases.116 However, at least two courts have acknowledged the
possibility of Chevron deference to agency antitrust decisions, proffer-
ing an alternative to the antitrust institutional status quo." 7
In California Dental Association v. FTC, the FTC invoked the
Chevron doctrine when the defendant challenged the FTC's jurisdic-
tion.118 Enforcing the Sherman Act through § 5 of the FTC Act, the
FTC brought suit against the California Dental Association (the "As-
sociation"), a nonprofit professional association, for establishing ad-
vertising restrictions that restrained trade.119 The dentists who
belonged to the Association agreed to adhere to a Code of Ethics as
part of their membership.120 The Code of Ethics, on its face, re-
stricted members from advertising in a false or misleading manner,
advertising in a way that detracted from the dental profession gener-
ally, and advertising in a way that misrepresented the quality of dental
110. See id. at 865.
111. Id.
112. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
113. Id. at 865-66.
114. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 765-66 (1999).
115. See id. at 756, 765-66.
116. See id. at 767 n.6; Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1067 (11th Cir. 2005).
117. See Mich. Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d at 1285, 1291 (D.C. Cir.
1989); In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1155 n.9 (D. Idaho
2001).
118. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 765-66.
119. Id. at 762.
120. Id. at 760.
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services provided.121 Members who violated the Association's regula-
tions were subject to "censure, suspension, or expulsion from the
[Association]. "122
The Federal Trade Commission accused the Association of using
the restrictions "so as to restrict truthful, nondeceptive advertising."12 3
According to the FTC, the Association "unreasonably prevented
members and potential members from using truthful, nondeceptive
advertising, all to the detriment of both dentists and consumers of
dental services."1 24 The advertising restrictions prevented the dentists
from effectively competing on terms of price or quality.125 The Com-
mission found the Association's restrictions on advertising to be per se
illegal or, in the alternative, to be illegal under a quick-look analy-
sis.126 The Association appealed, challenging both the FTC's jurisdic-
tion over nonprofit entities and the FTC's legal analysis.127
When the case came before the Supreme Court, the FTC invoked
Chevron deference to protect its jurisdiction over the nonprofit Asso-
ciation.128 Under the FTC Act, the FTC has authority over "corpora-
tions," defined as "any company . . . or association, incorporated or
unincorporated, without shares of capital or capital stock or certifi-
cates of interest . .. which is organized to carry on business for its own
profit or that of its members."1 29 While one could interpret "business
for its own profit or that of its members" to not include nonprofit
entities, the court did not think so.o30 The FTC had jurisdiction over
the Association, as this was "clearly the better reading of the statute
under ordinary principles of construction."131 Rather than providing
the FTC with interpretive power, the Court parsed the statute's lan-
guage and legislative history itself.132 The Supreme Court was almost
hostile to the FTC's attempt to assert Chevron deference over the
FTC's own antitrust jurisdiction. 33
But the FTC faired much worse on California Dental Association's
substantive side: the FTC neglected to assert Chevron deference over
121. Id.
122. Id. at 762.
123. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 762.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 762-63.
127. Id. at 763.
128. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 765.
129. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006).
130. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 766.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 766-69.
133. See id.
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its interpretation of § 5 of the FTC Act and the Court let its own eco-
nomic analysis be its guide.134 The FTC Act's prohibition of unfair
competition and unfair acts or practices is obviously ambiguous and
requires a policy judgment.135 The FTC exercised its expertise to find
that the Association's advertising restrictions were either illegal per se
or illegal "under an abbreviated, or 'quick-look,' rule of reason analy-
sis."136 The FTC Chairman who authored the FTC's opinion, Chair-
man Pitofsky, was insistent "on making a clear distinction between per
se rules and rule of reason analysis."1 37 A longtime antitrust academic
and practitioner, Chairman Pitofsky was worried about per se's "doc-
trinal erosion" and its accompanying uncertainty and increased litiga-
tion costs.' 38
The Supreme Court, however, found the FTC's abbreviated analy-
ses insufficient.' 39 The Court was uncomfortable with the FTC's ab-
breviated choice of legal analysis preferring to demand its own.140
Nevermind the FTC's expertise and that "[a] large body of empirical
work examining ... the effects of restraints on advertising and other
practices in various professions, leaves no real doubt that such re-
straints are anticompetitive."141 The Court paid no heed to the FTC's
expert role, ordering an "enquiry meet for the case."142
Ultimately, the point is twofold: (1) there is some doubt as to
whether California Dental Association was appropriately decided, and
(2) the Supreme Court should not have been deciding a matter within
the FTC's expert wheelhouse. 143 A similar conclusion can be made
regarding the Eleventh Circuit's treatment of the FTC in Schering-
Plough Corp. v. FTC.144 In Schering-Plough, the FTC brought suit
against Schering-Plough ("Schering"), a pharmaceutical manufac-
turer, for paying two generic pharmaceutical manufacturers to delay
the introduction of generic equivalents to Schering's patented potas-
134. See id. at 759.
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984).
136. See Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 763.
137. Jonathan B. Baker, Two Modern Antitrust Moments: A Comment on Fenton and Kwoka,
72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1029, 1034 (2005).
138. Id. at 1034-35.
139. See Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 759.
140. See id.
141. John E. Kwoka, Jr., The Federal Trade Commission and the Professions: A Quarter Cen-
tury of Accomplishment and Some New Challenges, 72 ANITrRUST L.J. 997, 1011 (2005).
142. See Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 781.
143. See id.; Kwoka, supra note 141, at 1011.
144. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1067 (11th Cir. 2005).
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sium chloride supplement. 1 4 5 Schering paid one generic manufacturer
sixty million dollars and another manufacturer thirty million dollars to
refrain from entering the market.
The FTC Commissioners found Schering's payments to be in viola-
tion of § 5 of the FTC Act, as they were "veiled attempts to disguise a
quid pro quo arrangement aimed at preserving Schering's monopoly
in the potassium chloride supplement market." 146 The Commission
had been studying drug company settlements since the mid-1990s and
"performing empirical research on the entry of generics and monitor-
ing settlement developments." 147 After analyzing the industry, and
Schering's settlements, the Commission placed a two million dollar
limit on reverse settlement agreements, "announc[ing] a bright-line
rule that was meant to apply generally to the pharmaceutical
industry." 148
While the FTC may not have invoked Chevron, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit did not hesitate to overrule the FTC's interpretation of the FTC
Act and bright-line policy pronouncement. 149 The court disagreed
with the Commission's "interpretation of the evidence bearing upon
the motive for Schering's decision to pay two generic entrants . . . to
delay the introduction of generic equivalents . . . [and] rebuked the
agency for not adhering to the analytical approach and policy perspec-
tive that the Eleventh Circuit had endorsed" in another case.o50
The court's criticism of the FTC's bright-line rule and finding of
liability was misplaced. 151 First, the court's analysis overlooked the
fact that "a larger payment suggests a more socially costly outcome-
namely, preserving the exclusion power of the patent ... [and] [t]he
result is to deny the public the benefits of competition that it could
otherwise obtain."152 It is unlikely that Schering had another motive
for the payment, and the Commission's forty pages of fact finding sup-
port the FTC's two million dollar rule.153 Second, the FTC's analyti-
cal framework was "much more sensitive to the administrative
difficulties and anticompetitive threats presented by [reverse pay-
145. Id. at 1058.
146. See id. at 1068.
147. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 54, at 1247-48.
148. CRANE, supra note 2, at 143; see Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1062.
149. See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1076.
150. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 54, at 1247.
151. See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1062; CRANE, supra note 2, at 143; Herbert
Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 11, 26
(2004).
152. Hovenkamp, supra note 151, at 26.
153. See id.; GAVIL ET AL., supra note 54, at 1247.
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ment] cases."1 54 The Eleventh Circuit's focus on circumstantial evi-
dence was misplaced given the multitude of uncertainties related to
the patent's validity, the "anticipated future profits, the risk of the
defendants' inability to satisfy a judgment, [and] anticipated litigation
costs." 5 5 The direct evidence of the payment size and the defendant's
own estimate of the "anticipated loss of huge sales as a consequence
of generic entry" were sufficiently probing in this uncertain context to
shift the burden to the "respondent to come forward with a procom-
petitive justification for the payment."156
Again, there are two points here: (1) the Eleventh Circuit likely got
Schering-Plough wrong, and (2) the court should have given the FTC
Chevron deference.'57 Schering-Plough-an antitrust case at the in-
tersection of complex pharmaceutical and intellectual property mar-
kets-exemplifies the need to defer to an agency whose sole purpose
is to regulate markets. 58 Courts are ill-equipped to make expert judg-
ments, and when they do, they often cross the line into policy mak-
ing.159 This raises the same democratic concerns that animated the
FTC's creation.160
Putting aside California Dental Association and Schering-Plough's
missteps, at least two courts have acknowledged the possibility of giv-
ing Chevron deference to agency statutory interpretations in the anti-
trust realm.161 In In re Fresh & Process Potatoes, the court
acknowledged that the FTC should receive Chevron deference when
antitrust laws are ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is reason-
able.162 Given that the Fresh & Process case was between private liti-
gants, the court had to resolve the case by determining the statute's
meaning.163 But in interpreting the statute, the court acknowledged
that "to the degree there is ambiguity in the statute on [the exemption
issue], agencies with jurisdiction over the statute are typically entitled
to Chevron deference." 64 As the FTC is one of the primary agencies
154. Hovenkamp, supra note 151, at 30.
155. Id. at 29.
156. Id. at 30.
157. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC., 402 F.3d 1056, 1062 (11th Cir. 2005); CRANE, supra
note 2, at 143; Hovenkamp, supra note 151, at 26.
158. See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1062-66.
159. See id.
160. See Cummins Report, supra note 8, at 3737.
161. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999); Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at
1062; Mich. Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In
re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1155 n.9 (D. Idaho 2011).
162. In re Fresh & Process, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1155 n.9.
163. See id.
164. Id.
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"responsible for enforcing the antitrust laws" the agency's interpreta-
tion should be given weight. 165
The court in Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v. Thorn-
burg gave Chevron deference to the Attorney General's interpreta-
tion of the Newspaper Preservation Act's joint operating agreement
exemption to antitrust law.1 6 6 The dispute centered on the Attorney
General's interpretation of whether one of the parties entering into
the joint operating agreement was "in probable danger of financial
failure."1 67 But the court refused to interject its own interpretation,
respecting the Attorney General's economic assessment of whether
the parties legally met the probable danger standard as a matter of
law. The court found that "[t]he Attorney General's interpretation of
the probable danger of financial failure test draws content from" the
case's economic facts and that the Attorney General's interpretation
was reasonable.168 The Attorney General used his expertise, and it
was not the court's job to second-guess the Attorney General's
decision.169
V. INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS
By now the point should be clear: Antitrust's decision-making locus
needs to move from generalist Article III courts to the expert FTC in
order to satisfy Congress's original desires and to place the expert de-
cisions with the experts. The aforementioned cases should suggest
that courts are less capable than the FTC to handle complex antitrust
doctrine, and Chevron can be applied in the antitrust context.170
Some have argued that limited agency oversight reduces accountabil-
ity and is antidemocratic; but this ignores the realities of antitrust de-
cision-making in an increasingly complex world. Going forward, the
FTC may be more likely to receive Chevron deference if the agency
undertakes two reforms.171 The FTC should gradually use its "norm-
creation" ability to encourage courts to grant the agency Chevron def-
erence.172 Additionally, the agency's expertise is not perfect.173 The
165. Id.
166. Mich. Citizens, 868 F.2d at 1287.
167. Id. at 1291.
168. Id. at 1291-94.
169. See id. at 1293.
170. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC,
402 F.3d 1056,1062 (11th Cir. 2005); Mich. Citizens, 868 F.2d at 1287; In re Fresh & Process
Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1155 n.9 (D. Idaho 2011).
171. See CRANE, supra note 2, at 142.
172. Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1207 (2008).
173. See Kovacic, supra note 9, at 950.
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agency needs to augment its expertise in key areas in order to keep up
with complex markets.174 Doing so would strengthen the case for
Chevron deference and help to outweigh the counterarguments to
greater FTC decision-making authority.
The primary counterargument to granting the FTC Chevron defer-
ence is common to Chevron deference generally: By making FTC de-
cisions subject to less judicial scrutiny, one is reducing expert
accountability and eroding democracy. 175 Judicial deference would
nurture a technocratic state where agency decision makers bury
opaque scientific decisions in mounds of incomprehensible data. 176
Judicial review fosters accountability by unearthing improper eco-
nomic decisions, translating obscure agency decisions for mass con-
sumption, and tying agency decisions to congressional or popular
desires.177
But the judiciary's ability to discover normatively inappropriate
FTC legal decisions is overestimated. Disregarding transaction costs,
an additional layer of review could be beneficial. However, a general-
ist judge reviewing highly technocratic rulings only adds another
chance for mistakes. This is not to say that the FTC does not make
mistakes. The FTC certainly has expertise deficiencies, which are ad-
dressed below. Rather, the benefits conferred by discerned improper
decisions are minimal relative to the costs of incorrectly overturned
decisions. Furthermore, while some have argued that courts foster ac-
countability by translating agency decisions,178 this presumes that judi-
cial translations are correct. Courts may actually cloud or
misrepresent agency decisions.
Even if the judiciary could unearth improper FTC decisions, would
greater deference to FTC decision making risk accountability? Per-
haps not: One study has found that FTC enforcement actions are
highly correlated with the preferences of FTC congressional oversight
174. See William E. Kovacic, Antitrust in High-Tech Industries: Improving the Federal Anti-
trust Joint Venture, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1097, 1098 (2012).
175. Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, The Science Obsession, and Judicial Review
as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 735 (2011) ("As noted by scholars in
other contexts, extraordinary deference as a general matter stands in tension with the expecta-
tion that courts must reinforce administrative-law values like participation, transparency, and
deliberation."). In addition to the two counterarguments discussed here, some have pointed out
that giving the FTC Chevron deference would upset the current antitrust dual enforcement re-
gime. To resolve this, Professor Crane has argued for unifying the DOJ and FTC's antitrust
enforcement under one agency, or at least making FTC rulemaking binding on DOJ enforce-
ment actions. Crane, supra note 172, at 1209-10.
176. Meazall, supra note 175, at 750-56.
177. Id. at 735.
178. Id. at 778.
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committees. 179 Assuming a causal relationship, this suggests that the
FTC is quite accountable to congressional desires under the current
system, perhaps acknowledging the true nature of scientific poli-
cymaking.180 Ambiguities and uncertainties must always be resolved
by some degree of political choice.18' Who should ultimately make
the decision, courts or the FTC, is a relative question. The court in
Schering-Plough itself noted, "[o]ur conclusion, to a degree, and we
hope the FTC is mindful of this, reflects policy." 182 But unaccounta-
ble federal courts are the least appropriate venue for policy making. 183
Both courts and the FTC have political dispositions, but only the FTC
can bring expertise to bear on scientific questions.
Putting counterarguments aside, the FTC can do at least two things
to fortify its expertise and encourage Chevron deference to agency
antitrust decisions. First, the FTC will be more likely to receive Chev-
ron deference if it frames its decisions as legal rules.184 Legal rules,
unlike factual findings, should be entitled to Chevron deference.'85
Economic conclusions may even be entitled to Chevron deference, but
cases conflict on this issue.186 The FTC can frame its decisions as legal
rules either through the agency's formal rulemaking authority or by
announcing legal rules in formal adjudication.187 The FTC has the
power to make antitrust rules in an informal rulemaking proceeding
under 15 U.S.C. § 46(g).188 A court may be particularly apt to grant
Chevron deference to an antitrust rule instituted in an informal
rulemaking proceeding, given the thoroughness and industry partici-
pation that informal rulemaking proceedings include.189 The informal
rulemaking process may also "help to refocus the deference question
by highlighting the FTC's administrative (as opposed to law enforce-
ment) character and underlying . .. statutory rule-making powers."1 90
179. CRANE, supra note 2, at 35.
180. Meazall, supra note 175, at 743-44.
181. Id.
182. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005).
183. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
184. CRANE, supra note 2, at 142.
185. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865; Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1062; CRANE, supra note 2, at
142.
186. Compare Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1062 with Mich. Citizens for an Indep. Press v.
Thornburg, 868 F.2d 1285, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1989). I would argue that the line between legal
interpretations, rooted in economic analysis, and standalone economic conclusions is hard to
parse.
187. CRANE, supra note 2, at 142.
188. For further discussion, see supra notes 39-41.
189. CRANE, supra note 2, at 142.
190. Id.
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It is true that legal rules can also be announced in formal adjudica-
tion, as the agency did in Schering-Plough.191 But rules announced in
such settings may provide parties with less certainty, as their binding
authority on future FTC decisions may be unclear. Courts may also
be less likely to defer to these decisions, as agency adjudications bear
more resemblance to Article III court proceedings than notice and
comment rulemakings.
Some have argued that antitrust rulemaking "do[es] not lend [itself]
to categorical resolution," but this may not be the case. 192 One could
establish a per se presumption against the use of trade association ad-
vertising restrictions, like those in California Dental Association.193
The Commission's two million dollar limit on reverse settlement
agreements in Schering-Plough suggests another possibility.194 A rule
could also be made to require specific cost measurements in varying
predatory pricing contexts.
Second, the FTC can strengthen its case for Chevron deference by
augmenting its expertise in key areas. As discussed in section II, the
FTC's several technocratic layers are superior to a single decision
maker in the antitrust setting. The FTC has five expert commissioners
who serve seven-year terms. Ideally these commissioners are drawn
from the antitrust legal community, are economists, are experienced
in business, or are some combination thereof. Working in the same
area for years does help commissioners that lack these experiences to
"develop an understanding of economic markets." 195 However, learn-
ing on the job may not be sufficient. 196 Commissioners have often
been appointed "as rewards for faithful political service" without truly
assessing their qualification. 197 As William Kovacic notes in a 1997
legal article: "Virtually all appointees since the late 1960s have been
bright individuals, but only a handful have been experts of truly ex-
ceptional accomplishment and stature, and only a minority have
brought significant antitrust or consumer protection expertise to the
FTC."198 "[T]he rarity of genuinely superior appointments has denied
the agency the intellectual capital needed to play its intended role as
191. See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1062; CRANE, supra note 2, at 143.
192. CRANE, supra note 2, at 142-43.
193. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999); Baker, supra note 137, at 1034.
194. See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1062; CRANE, supra note 2, at 143; Hemphill, supra note
33, at 673.
195. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, 1 302h5.
196. Kovacic, supra note 9, at 950.
197. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
761, 768 (2005).
198. Kovacic, supra note 9, at 950.
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the nation's preeminent competition policy institution and to persuade
the courts, Congress, and other observers that its policy choices are
worthy of respect."199
Though not writing in the Chevron deference context, William
Kovacic's comments are quite relevant. The President and Senate
must put political priorities aside when appointing commissioners if
the agency is to successfully oversee the market. 200 Fortunately, there
has been some progress since William Kovacic's alarming assessment
of commissioner expertise. All of the FTC's current commissioners
have spent at least a decade working in antitrust for the agency, in
private practice, or for a state attorney general. 201 For example, Com-
missioner Brill served as an Assistant Attorney General in antitrust
for the State of Vermont for over twenty years, was an associate at
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, and has been a Lecturer-
in-Law at Columbia University's School of Law.202
One of President Obama's most recent appointees, Joshua D.
Wright, is the consummate antitrust expert.203 Commissioner Wright
holds a Ph.D. in Economics and a law degree from UCLA.204 He has
worked at the Commission in several capacities-including as its first
Scholar-in-Residence-authored more than sixty articles and book
chapters on antitrust law, and held a dual appointment in George Ma-
son University's Law and Economics departments. 205 Commissioner
Wright clearly alleviates commission level expertise concerns. 206 One
hopes the recent string of quality appointments continues.
In addition to reforms at the commission level, the FTC needs to
strengthen its staff's ability to assess complex technological markets
and products in order to maintain its advantage over the judiciary. An
agency's staff is only expert in areas it understands.207 All administra-
tive agencies must "routinely . .. examine the fit between its activities
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and the expertise of its professionals." 208 Technology has rapidly
changed over the last decade, and even more so in the last two or
three years. The problem is not new, but the pace of change may be.
Microsoft, once the target of many an antitrust suit, is currently scram-
bling to grapple with the decline of the personal computer industry as
consumer interest in mobile devices has spiked.209 Social networking
did not exist ten years ago, yet Facebook and Twitter may be FTC
antitrust targets in the near future.
In order to protect these innovative markets, the FTC needs to be
able to understand them. Technology's constant, rapid change "com-
plicates each major task associated with the application of the federal
antitrust statutes: the measurement of market power, the assessment
of competitive effects, and the formulation of remedies." 210 To deal
with this, the agency needs to recruit "more professionals with exper-
tise in disciplines related to high technology." 211 Up until the early
2000s, the FTC had only one patent attorney. 212 Currently, the agency
has roughly ten patent attorneys, but "it is apparent that the mainte-
nance of superior human capital in this area will require continuing
attention." 213
In addition to adding specialty attorneys, the FTC should also con-
sider adding computer science professionals. A monopolist's exclu-
sionary practices are often inherent to the product itself in Sherman
Act § 2 cases. While some courts have balked at examining product
design,214 at least a cursory probing of a product's technological un-
derpinnings may be necessary in some cases. 215 Without a back-
ground in computer science, the product may be too complicated for
one to assess the product's exclusionary effects, or too complicated to
assess its pro-competitive benefits.
The FTC's recent Google antitrust investigation is illustrative.
Among other practices, the Commission examined whether "Google
unfairly promoted its own vertical properties through changes in its
search results page," such as using Google's algorithm to demote com-
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petitors' links in search results and introducing a "Universal Search"
box that pushed competitor links down the page.216 While there was
no doubt that "some of Google's algorithm and design changes re-
sulted in the demotion of websites," the critical issue was whether
Google may have done so to "improve the quality of its search prod-
uct and the overall user experience." 217 The Commission did "con-
duct[ ] empirical analyses to investigate the impact of Google's design
changes on search engine traffic and user click-through behavior." 218
However, the opaque nature of Google's search engine, and Google's
ability to manipulate consumer choice, make click-through rates an
incomplete measure of product quality. They may reflect carefully
manipulated behavioral desires rather than informed decisions about
product quality. Thus, to better understand the relationship between
the consumer and Google's search engine, one has to analyze the al-
gorithm itself. The algorithm and the way it performs in relation to
consumer inputs-both in terms of a consumer's current search and a
consumer's previous search history-can help one to better discern
whether Google's search engine manipulation is indeed a pro-compet-
itive product improvement. Having staff with computer science back-
grounds would make such analysis possible. It is unclear whether this
analysis would have changed the Google investigation's outcome, but
at the very least it would have allowed for a more developed rule of
reason analysis. Adding staff versed in technology would improve the
FTC's ability to analyze dynamic technological markets and allow
courts to more comfortably defer to FTC decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The FTC should assert, and courts should grant, Chevron deference
to protect FTC expert decisions from judicial meddling and to ulti-
mately establish the technocratic institutional structure that Congress
sought in 1914. Congress may have felt that antitrust law had reached
a "technical" tipping point in 1914 when it founded the FTC to be
"more competent to deal with the practical ... dissolution of [busi-
ness] combinations than any court or Attorney General could be." 219
Yet contrary to Congressional desires, the judiciary has charted a path
to maintain the same institutional role that it had prior to the FTC
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Act's passing. It is true that courts have recognized their institutional
foibles as antitrust law has grown more complex; indeed, courts have
erected procedural barriers and created heightened substantive stan-
dards to protect themselves from false positive rulings. But the judici-
ary has yet to grant the FTC Chevron deference to protect the FTC's
role as experts and policymakers. The FTC would be more likely to
receive Chevron deference if it used its rulemaking power and bol-
stered its expertise in key areas.
In closing, it seems doubtful that antitrust will get less technical, less
complex, or less opaque. The economy will likely grow more special-
ized, and antitrust economics will require a more discerning eye. Per-
haps antitrust is merely at an interim point; despite not adhering
strictly to Congress's 1914 desires, courts have gradually been moving
in a technocratic direction with the modern economy. For the sake of
this modern economy, one hopes the FTC will be proactive, seize on
this technocratic shift, invoke Chevron deference, and courts will trust
the FTC's relative superiority.
